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IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNET FOR QUASI-LEGISLATIVE
INSTRUMENTS OF REGULATION
Peter L. Strauss*
It is a quarter century since I began telling my Administrative Law students
that they had better be watching the Internet and how agencies of interest to
them were using it, as they entered an Information Age career. The changes
since then have been remarkable. Rulemaking, where the pace has perhaps
been slowest, is now accelerating into the Internet, driven by a President
committed to openness and consultation. This paper seeks little more than to
point the reader toward the places where she can find the changes and watch
them for herself.
Il y a un quart de siècle que j’ai commencé à dire à mes étudiants en droit
administratif qu’ils feraient bien de surveiller l’Internet et comment les agences
qui les intéressent s’en servent, au moment où ils entreprenaient une carrière à
l’ère de l’information. Les changements depuis lors ont été remarquables.
L’élaboration de règles, où l’évolution a peut-être été la plus lente, s’accélère
maintenant à l’Internet, mené par un Président qui s’est engagé à l’ouverture et
à la consultation. Cet article ne vise pas plus que d’indiquer à la personne qui
le lit les endroits où elle peut trouver les changements et les surveiller pour ellemême.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our exploding experience with technology has extraordinary implications across the
full range of governmental activities. As Vivek Kundra, the United States‟ Chief
Information Officer, remarked at a recent press conference in San Francisco,
“technology deployed for public service can fundamentally change how a government
and its people interact.” At the time, he and others were addressing the delivery of
government services – creating a common platform for municipal service calls (311)
that would permit using Twitter in any city to report a need for pothole repair was the
repeated example. The focus in this paper is on a more limited set of developments –
not on the delivery of services, but on the formation and to a lesser extent the
implementation of policy through agency quasi-legislation.
The Information Age has spawned two dominating changes in
visibility/accessibility and, perhaps, participation respecting the development of
agency regulations (“tertiary legislation,” in EU parlance; “subsidiary legislation,”
often in national systems) and guidance instruments (“soft law”): first, the emergence
of readily searchable, universally accessible Internet data sets permitting immediate,
essentially cost-free, and universal access to government information bearing on
proposed regulatory actions, the proposals themselves, comments and data supplied
by others, and the regulations or guidance documents that result; and, second, the
1

*

1

Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Deep thanks to Cynthia Farina,
proactive and deeply engaged in these issues as the following pages will attest, who has been generous
with comments and suggestions; Natalie Orpett provided valuable research assistance. Responsibility
for these pages is mine alone.
“US Chief Information Officer Press conference” (2 March 2010), online: SFGTV
< http://san-francisco.granicus.com/Media-Player.php?publish_id=557>.

(2010) 28 Windsor Y B Access Just

377

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1906706

378

Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice

2010

development of interactive sites permitting persons to enroll for notice of
developments of possible interest to them, and to submit commentary on proposals
that concern them. My hope for this paper is to spark a conversation about these
developments, as and if they are evidencing themselves in our respective legal
cultures, and their possible implications for the future of quasi-legislative
administrative action.
The legitimacy of permitting unelected officials to create binding legal texts is an
enduring problem for any democracy. “In an era when executive authority seems to
be growing at the cost of parliamentary accountability,” Genevieve Cartier wrote in
the Canadian context, “democratic control over policy-making seems ever more
urgent.” The literature about the European Union often invokes a “democracy
deficit” in discussing the regulation-like “implementing measures” that emerge there
as tertiary legislative instruments, corresponding to agency regulations in the USA.
“Implementing measures” emerge from the shadowy process of “comitology,” a
hidden and bureaucratic process whose very name suggests arcane mysteries and
possible intrigue. Hence the “democracy deficit.” In the United States, one can
without difficulty ascribe a similar problem to agency regulations; although adopted
following a procedure involving both public notice, public participation, and
explanation, nonetheless the adopters are appointed, not elected, officials. They lack
the legislative connection of ministers in parliamentary democracies. The possible
influence of an elected President arguably increases, rather than diminishes, the
problem.
The growth in executive authority Professor Cartier wrote about has proved
inevitable in our complex age. A century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court found violation
of the Secretary of Agriculture‟s rules governing the grazing of sheep in national
forests, seen as an inevitable filling in of the details of a statute authorizing his
administration of those lands, to be in and of itself a basis for sending someone to
jail. Today, regulations emerge from agencies at ten to twenty times the rate
Congress produces statutes, and “soft law,” influential though not formally binding,
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Genevieve Cartier, “Procedural Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of Judicial Abstinence?”
(2003) 53 UTLJ 217 at 218.
These measures are two levels below the EU‟s constitutive treaties and one below its statute-like
“secondary” measures – regulations and directives adopted by its Parliament and Council, that
acquire legitimacy through the involvement of the European Parliament (and, to a lesser extent, a
Council composed of persons who are politically responsible on a national level), as well as the public
manner in which they are considered. See e.g., Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases
and Materials 4th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 134; Giandomenico Majone,
“Europe‟s „Democracy Deficit‟: The Question of Standards” (1998) 4 Eur LJ 5.
On these processes generally, see Peter L. Strauss, Turner Smith, & Lucas Bergkamp, “Rulemaking”
in George Bermann et al, eds, Administrative Law of the European Union (Washington D.C.: ABA, 2008).
Peter L. Strauss, “Overseer or „The Decider‟ – the President in Administrative Law” (2007) 75 Geo
Wash L Rev 695; Peter L. Strauss, “Presidential Rulemaking” (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent L Rev 965.
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
Congress enacts four hundred or so public laws annually; estimates of annual regulatory production I
have seen range between 4000 and 8000; no one counts soft law instruments, but at technical
agencies at least its volume is enormous – particularly as contemporary ideas about rulemaking
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is created in greater volumes still. This phenomenon is reflected in a hierarchy of
legal texts that I believe can be found in every developed economy:
Foundation document(s), adopted by “the nation”
Hundreds of statutes, adopted by an elected legislature
Thousands of regulations, adopted by politically responsible executive officials
Tens of thousands of interpretations and other guidance documents, issued by responsible bureaus
Countless advice letters, press releases, and other statements of understanding, generated by individual bureaucrat

We understand passably well the ordering and influence of the top three layers of this
hierarchy. Legal systems treat each of them as binding text, subject only to the
requirements that they be authorized by the superior authority and appropriately
adopted following designated procedures; if valid, each of them has legislative effect
on government and citizen alike, until displaced by another text validly adopted at the
same or a higher level. It is on passing from the second to the third tier that the
“democracy deficit” problem rears its head. We understand, too, that the innumerable
informal items of the fifth tier, while often in fact influential on private conduct, are
denied any jural effect. We would find some confusion on the fourth, “soft law” tier –
confusion whether these documents are legitimate instruments of agency policy, or a
ruse to evade the higher procedural obligations associated with adopting regulations;
confusion whether an agency may give them any jural effect and, if so, to what
degree; and confusion whether and to what extent they must be respected by the
courts. And soft law documents, much less often given the imprimatur of the
Ministers, Secretaries or Administrators who head political agencies, present the
“democracy deficit” problem in even sharper outline.
In another essay, I have explored the question whether Americans can find a
satisfying resolution of the deficit in the “strong unitary executive theory” popular
among some American academics – that is, the claim that our elected President is
entitled to decide all policy issues Congress may have delegated to the various
Departments and administrative agencies of our government. As would not surprise
anyone familiar with my earlier writings, I concluded there that reconciling delegated
executive authority of a law-making character with democratic ideals on a theory of
8
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encourage the adoption of malleable standards setting goals for achievement rather than precise rules
prescribing particular courses of action The regulated then earnestly and understandably seek
guidance about ways in which they might be able to meet those standards.
On this subject see Peter L. Strauss, “Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper
Respect for an Essential Element” (2001) 53 Admin L Rev 803; for a similar understanding of the
Canadian situation, see Laura Pottie & Lorne Sossin, “Demystifying the Boundaries of Public Law:
Policy, Discretion, and Social Welfare” (2005) 38 UBC L Rev 147
Peter L. Strauss, “Legislation that Isn‟t: Attending to Rulemaking‟s Democracy Deficit” (2010) 98 Cal
L Rev at 1351.
Strauss, supra note 5.
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voter-ratified political will is deeply unsatisfying, if not hazardous to our rule-of-law
culture. We tolerate agency specification of, for example, permitted pollutant levels
only because it involves acts of reasoned judgment, within frameworks established by
statutes and subject to judicial review. “We must so construct the President‟s relation
to government as to permit the enduring belief that we live in a rule-of-law culture of
constrained reasonable judgment, even as we recognize the contributions that
political will can make.”
My ambitions here are different – to explore the variety of ways in which
governmental use of the Internet may engage citizens in the world of quasi-legislation
and in doing so, just possibly, provide its own response to the “democracy deficit.”
The paragraphs following will draw primarily on the developments at the level of
American federal government, with occasional reference to state practice and to the
practices of the European Union. Their intention is, simply, to provide a framework
for further discussion and documentation of progress in our respective legal systems.
11

12

II. SECRET LAW
"We hear of tyrants, and those cruel ones: but, whatever we may
Have felt, we have never heard of any tyrant in such sort cruel,
As to punish men for disobedience to laws or orders
Which he had kept them from the knowledge of."
13

The first case in which the United States Supreme Court held a congressional statute
to be invalid as an excessive delegation of authority14 dramatized the problem of
secret law. A depression-era statute had given the President certain authority to
control interstate commerce in petroleum and its products, as a means of stabilizing
prices; and he and the Secretary of the Interior (to whom he had subdelegated this
power) had adopted rules in the exercise of that authority. When the validity of this
statute came before the Supreme Court (all but one of whose members would find it
to be standardless), the government was embarrassed to admit that a reexamination
of the relevant documents (which at the time were not publicly available) had revealed
that the Secretary had inadvertently revoked the relevant regulation before the lawsuit
had been filed.15 “[I]t was shocking that the government attorneys, the private parties,
and the courts had not been aware of the status of the regulation. „The furor resulting
from the hot oil case provided the final impetus for the enactment of remedial
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Strauss, supra note 9 at n 86.
Drawing on European Union Administrative Law, supra note 4.
Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh, UK: William Tait, 1843) vol 5 at 547;
Erwin N Griswold used this as the epigram to his “Government in Ignorance of the Law--A Plea for
Better Publication of Executive Legislation” (1934) 48 Harv L Rev 198, discussed in text at n 17
below.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Ibid at 412-413.
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legislation [the Federal Register Act] in 1935.‟”16 Just the prior year, only weeks before
the argument and decision in the case – perhaps even sensing what would likely
transpire – Erwin Griswold (later to become Dean of Harvard Law School and US
Solicitor General) had argued passionately and persuasively the need for “a
reasonable means of distributing and preserving the texts of ... executive-made law.”17
The Federal Register, a daily gazette of executive branch documents including rules
and rulemaking proposals, was the result.
The Federal Register, like such publications generally, was a useful but imperfect
response to the problem of secret law. A bulky daily publication, with an ambitious
yet (necessarily) limited index, its effective use required lawyers and librarians.
Moreover, it was incomplete. While regulations were included, “soft law” documents
– guidance and interpretations – generally were not. Access to “soft law” might be
possible – the federal Administrative Procedure Act [APA] encouraged its public
availability and indexing by provisions prohibiting its use to the disadvantage of
private parties unless it was available and indexed18 – but that access might require
travel to one of a limited number of agency reading rooms, or perhaps to a specific
agency office. Just what might constitute a qualifying index was nowhere specified,
and one can readily imagine many obstacles to its detail. If not precisely secret, then,
regulatory law was often obscure and access to it expensive.
Providing further relief from the problems of secret law is perhaps the most
obvious use of the Internet. In 1994 the Federal Register and in 1996 the Code of
Federal Regulations (where adopted regulations are eventually collected) were
embedded and made readily searchable at the website of the Government Printing
Office,19 one of the first important federal e-government projects. They are now
available as well on for-profit and non-profit sites such as Lexis and Cornell‟s Legal
Information Institute.20 Each agency‟s electronic reading room, required by law, 21
holds regulations, guidance, interpretations, staff manuals – any quasi-legislative
document in which the public might be interested.22 If Boolean search is enabled, the
documents are not only there, but also exquisitely indexed, in a manner no print
edition or document filing system could hope to achieve. The interventions of
16
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Mary Whisner, “Practicing Reference . . . A Manual „to Inform Every Citizen‟” (2007) 99 Law Libr J
159 at 160, citing Morris L. Cohen, Robert C. Berring & Kent C. Olson, How To Find The Law , 9th ed
(St. Paul: Westlaw, 1989) at 265.
Griswold, supra note 13. Griswold was on the staff of the Solicitor General‟s office until 1934, when
Panama Refining was briefed; Thus he could easily have been aware of the coming firestorm; his
article was published in the December, 1934 issue of the Law Review; argument in Panama Refining
was held that month, and the decision announced in January 1935.
5 U.S.C. 551(a) (1, 2).
Code of Federal Regulations, online: US Government Printing Office <http://www.gpo- access.
gov/index.html>.
See Cornell University Legal Information Institute, online: Cornell University Legal Information
Institute < http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/>.
Required in America at the national level by the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of
1966, Pub. L. 104-231, Oct. 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 3048, amending 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2).
See e.g. online: FAA <http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/>, collecting a wide range of soft
law documents as well as FAA regulations.
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librarians and lawyers are no longer required (although they may still be useful); if the
document is in the electronic library, it cannot be “off the shelf” and on someone
else‟s desk.
One of the more important regulations issued by the Department of
Transportation‟s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA] has been
its Standard 208,23 requiring the installation first of seatbelts and then of airbags in
American automobiles. Understandably, manufacturers and others have had
questions about the requirements of the standard, and interpretation of its provisions,
which they have addressed to NHTSA‟s General Counsel. His interpretive letters
responding to their inquiries have always been public documents, but access to them
once depended on either visiting his office in Washington, D.C. or finding an
industry group or member that had made its own collection. One can imagine both
the expense of hiring a lawyer to perform that search, and the imperfections of the
filing system she would encounter. Enter the website NHTSA has been maintaining
for years, collecting the opinion letters of its Chief Counsel, making them available
for Boolean search,24 and promising their reliability.25 Its enterprise so impressed
General Motors and an industry group that had begun electronic recordkeeping years
before NHTSA supplemented its paper files, that they each donated their electronic
records of earlier letters for inclusion in the searchable repository. Now using an
Internet connection half a continent (or half the world) away from Washington,
anyone wishing to learn NHTSA‟s interpretations of Standard 208 (or any of its other
regulations) reliably has that information in seconds. The visibility of government
law, hard and soft, has been exponentially increased.
To be sure, even this simplest and most obvious use remains a work in process.
The European Union offers a single search-enabled Internet gateway to “legislation,”

23
24
25

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards And Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 552, 571, 585, and 595
See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, online: NHTSA: <http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/>.
See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, online: <http://www.n-h-t-s- a.dot.gov/
portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.4d1e17245-efafde89-ec0f-210dba046-a0>. The Chief Counsel‟s
promise, “The Chief Counsel's interpretations, issued in the form of letters responding to questions
from the motor vehicle industry and the public, represent the definitive view of the agency on the
questions addressed and may be relied upon by the regulated industry and members of the public,”
may be contrasted by the disclaimers many agencies post with their soft law (responding to
unfortunate signals sent by judicial review cases). The Food and Drug Administration, for example,
attaches this standard disclaimer to its guidance (“soft law”) documents:
This guidance represents the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) current
thinking on this topic. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person
and does not operate to bind FDA or the public. You can use an alternative
approach if the approach satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and
regulations. If you want to discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff
responsible for implementing this guidance. If you cannot identify the appropriate
FDA staff, call the appropriate number listed on the title page of this guidance.
See, e.g. Guidance for Industry, FDA Staff, and Third Parties - Inspection by Accredited Persons
Under The Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 and the FDA Amendments Act of 2007;
Accreditation Criteria, online: <http://www.fda.gov/Medical-Devices/Device-Regulation- andGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm089702.htm>.
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both enacted26 and under consideration,27 where “Legislation” is understood to
comprise all binding texts (i.e., tertiary as well as secondary measures), as well as
“certain important non-binding acts.” There is no uniform way to access either EC
or American agencies‟ soft law files.28 Other national practices remain highly variable.
At the state and local level in the USA, access even to regulations may still be
haphazard, and soft law is not yet readily accessible. 29 Converting paper documents
to electronic ones requires resources and incentives; both may be in short supply.
(This problem will prove even more prominent in the following sections of this
essay). One readily imagines, however, that this kind of use of the Internet will be the
fastest to become universal, with the result that the world of “secret law” will shrink
significantly, if not wholly disappear.30
III. KNOWING WHAT QUASI-LEGISLATORS KNOW AND WHAT
THEIR PLANS ARE
In American contemplation, the “democracy deficit” associated with quasilegislation creates often rigorous judicial attention to the rationality of its exercise.
Although (absent possible implications for important rights) American courts barely
consider the rationality of legislation or the regularity of legislative procedures when
they review legislation for constitutionality, the procedures prescribed for quasilegislation and the rationality of the judgments it reflects are strongly checked,
particularly in matters of high economic or social consequence. One characteristic
opinion, reviewing an Environmental Protection Agency rule with major economic
26

27
28
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See Europa, Eur Lex, online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/legis/index.htm>; see Cynthia Farina,
Sidney Shapiro and Thomas Susman, “Transparency and Data Protection in ABA Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice” in Bermann et al., supra note 6 at 21 ff.
See ibid. Europa Pre Lex, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en>.
In the Department of Transportation, for example, the FAA guidance is accessed directly from a
“Regulations & Policies” tab prominent at the top of its home page; NHTSA guidance, however,
much less prolix, requires one to know to follow the FOIA link obscure at the bottom of the home
page to FOIA Electronic Reading Room.
The California Office of Administrative Law, for example, offers what appears to be comprehensive
access to regulations adopted by California agencies but no access to soft law, other than manuals of
the Department of Social Services, online: OAL <http://www.oal.ca.gov/>; the web site of its
Department of Agriculture gives no hint that that vital department harbours any soft law. Online:
CDFA <http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/Regulations.html>. In New York, the equivalent office warns on
its website, indexing state agencies, that “If you are seeking regulations regarding a specific area, a
number of New York State agencies now make their rules and regulations available online. Others
document their statutory authority.” Online: Government of New York <http://www.g-o-rr.state.ny.us/Regulatory-Reform/current-regulations.htm>.
One cannot doubt that certain documents government agencies use to establish standards for their
employees‟ behaviour – “law” in the important sense that it marks the practical limit of state
tolerance for private actions – will be kept secret in the interest of avoiding manipulative or
challenging behaviors. If, for example, state police are secretly instructed to issue speeding tickets
only to motorists who exceed the legal speed limit by, say, ten miles per hour, that instruction may
rationally accommodate predictable differences in speedometer calibration and also serve to focus
attention on major violators; for it to be made public, however, would invite faster driving by many
and might eliminate the margin of error the practice creates.
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consequences for the coal and electric power industry as well as environmental
values, consumed 103 pages of an opinion closely attending to the EPA‟s reasoning
and the factual contentions it had to resolve, before remarking in conclusion, “we
have taken a long while to come to a short conclusion: the rule is reasonable.” 31
The last half-century‟s developments in American administrative law have
witnessed an emphatic growth in the transparency associated with both government
information and quasi-legislative planning. Integration of Internet resources into
these pre-existing trends is already considerably magnifying its effects.
Start with information. As enacted, the federal Administrative Procedure Act required
only that “matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made
available to persons properly and directly concerned,” with a “good cause”
confidentiality exception.32 The rulemaking procedure generally required public
notice of proposed rules with an opportunity for public comment prior to adoption,
with a “concise general statement of their basis and purpose” to accompany the
adopted rule; in addressing the policy issues involved, the notice need specify “either
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved.”33 In 1966, Congress had amended the APA to give “any person”
strongly enforcible rights to see any information in a government agency‟s possession,
to the extent it did not fall within one of nine rather narrow exceptions – a freedom
of information measure [FOIA] now commonplace in world legal systems. 34 In
general,35 data (as distinct from preliminary policy views) was unprotected from such
claims; thus, a request for “all studies likely to be considered in connection with your
rulemaking proposed April 2, 2010” would likely have to be honoured (although no
formal procedural link is made between a citizen‟s request and a rulemaking to which
that request might relate). Perhaps reacting to the enhanced transparency the FOIA
had put in place (dramatically reemphasized by Congress in extensive strengthening
amendments it enacted in 1974), and/or the suddenly increasing importance of
rulemaking brought about by the great expansion of health and safety regulation in
the early 1970's, courts asserted that notice and comment procedures could not be
effective unless the government made available to the public, alongside its proposal,
important studies on which the proposal relied.36
Enter the Internet. The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996
envisaged moving FOIA activity to the Web – agencies are to have FOIA links on
their website, which explain the Act, permit the filing of electronic requests, and – as
importantly – are to serve as repositories for frequently requested material, so that it
37

31
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37

Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F. 2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir.1981).
60 Stat. 237, §3(c)
5 U.S.C. 553(b), Section 4(a) of the original APA (emphasis added).
The American Freedom of Information Act can be found at 5 U.S.C552(a) (3) and following.
Protection was afforded classified information, information compromising personal privacy interests,
and proprietary information provided by private parties.
Peter L. Strauss, “Statutes That Are Not Static – The Case of the APA” (2005) 14 J Contemp Legal
Issues 767.
Supra note 21.
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may simply be found there. Now public dockets could be created, to which any
relevant documents, including studies, could be posted for ready availability and
comment. Agency reaction to these developments was variable and, generally, slow;
the most thoroughgoing effort was made by the Department of Transportation,
which (at considerable savings for the Department) converted its entire filing system
to electronic form – much of it open to public access. Using its Data Management
System [DMS], interested members of the public could see every public document
associated with a given proceeding, within days of its filing. Supporting studies, earlyfiled comments and the like were thus available to commenters.
The E-Government Act of 2002 emphasized a national commitment to such
development. The Act requires agencies to accept comments “by electronic means”
and to make available in their e-dockets “public submissions and other materials that
by agency rule or practice are included in the rulemaking docket...whether or not
submitted electronically.” Although the mandate is qualified by “to the extent
practicable,” the idea is clearly that the public should be able to find everything in the
e-docket that they could find if they went to the agency reading room. Directed to
agencies, the Act did not itself require creation of the single, unified electronic data
system, but the Bush administration, in implementing it, moved all rulemaking to the
Internet through a new portal, Regulations.gov, and a unified data management
system associated with it, the Federal Data Management System [FDMS]. Works in
progress, the early difficulties of the Act‟s implementation and of Regulations.gov
were well captured in a law review article by Beth Noveck, a young law professor who
subsequently became a central figure in the Obama Administration‟s commitments to
open government, and by a report for the American Bar Association based on the
work of Cynthia Farina, another law professor who has since become a central figure
in Cornell‟s Electronic Rulemaking Initiative, discussed below.
One such problem: agency capacity and willingness to migrate to an electronic
docket (as DOT had) is mixed, so that for many agencies the FDMS dataset is both
incomplete and far from instantaneous, and search capabilities are limited. Even
today, not all agencies are uniformly (and timely) putting all materials in rulemaking
dockets on to their e-dockets available through Regulations.gov. Changes in
38
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Now incorporated into the Federal Data Management System, online: FDMS <http://docketsinfo.dot.gov/>; the process was complicated by the broader reach of the DMS, which entirely
replaced paper dockets at DOT; FDMS, at least initially, could not achieve that universality given
variablility in the readiness of different government agencies for such a transition. The transition and
its difficulties prompted DOT to create a generally helpful guide for FDMS searches, online: FDMS
<http://docketsinfo.dot.gov/FDMS_Tips.cfm>.
Sec. 206 (c) (d).
Online: Federal Government <http://www.regulations.gov>.
Beth Noveck, “The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking” (2004) 53 Emory LJ 1. Prof. Noveck is
currently United States Deputy Chief Technology Officer and Director of the White House Open
Government Initiative.
Committee on the Status and Future of Federal e-Rulemaking, Achieving the Potential: The Future of
Federal E-Rulemaking – A Report to Congress and the President (2008), available online: CERI
<http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/erm-comm.php> [ABA Study].
See text accompanying note 89 below.
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Regulations.gov and FDMA are occurring with regularity. As recently as April 7,
2010, for example, a memorandum from Cass Sunstein, the Administrator of the
White House Office of Management and Budget [OMB]‟s Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs [OIRA] directed all agencies to “make it easier for members of the
public to find and view [rulemaking] information ... [by using] the Regulation
Identifier Number [RIN] on all relevant documents throughout the entire „lifecycle‟
of a rulemaking ... [–] documents including, but not limited to, notices of proposed
rulemaking, final rules, and (to the extent that they are associated with a rulemaking)
notices, guidances, environmental impact statements, regulatory impact analyses,
information collections, and supporting materials.”
The Obama Administration‟s emphasis on improving government transparency,
captured in a presidential Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government issued the
day after his inauguration, has also produced an explosion in general data availability
(useful for but not necessarily connected to particular rulemakings). One such
development, likely to have a direct impact on rulemakings, is agency development of
public libraries of scientific reports; the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]‟s
recently launched Health and Environment Research Online database contains over
300,000 scientific studies searchable along a variety of parameters. A central
government website, data.gov, not only makes available to public use a rapidly
increasing number of machine readable federal datasets, but also links to datasets
identified by particular government agencies in response to the OMB‟s “Open
Government Directive,” and to the increasing number of state, local and tribal data
sites. Similar initiatives exist – are inevitable – elsewhere. They permit private
creation of programs letting the public use data they find for their own purposes – an
NGO could create a searchable database to let people “see” the local effects of sea
level rises that may be associated with global warming, just as EPA‟s Toxic Resource
Inventory now permits anyone to see what toxins are being released in their
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See online: OMB <http://www.white-house.gov/omb/assets/in-foreg/Increasing-Openness_0407-2010.pdf> While the RIN system has been in place for many years, the problem with
using it to track a rule (and electronically map/display its lifetime, in the manner of the European
Parliament and Commission sites) is that it has not been consistently used across agencies, or even
within a single agency over time. Inconsistency defeats efforts to build rule timelines automatically
(actually, it generally makes historical data about rulemaking problematic). The OMB memo is a first
step towards defining government-wide consistent practices.
See online: EPA <http://www.epa.gov/hero/>.
The directive, issued December 8, 2009 to implement President Obama‟s Memorandum, online:
White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/documents/open-government-directive> set
April 7, 2010 as a date by which each agency was to publish at least three high-value data-sets in an
open (platform independent, machine readable, and unrestricted) format, and every agency subject to
the memorandum did so. Online: Federal government <http://www.data.gov/open> and
White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/around>.
See online: OMB <http://www.data.gov/statedatasites>; see online: Data SF (San Francisco)
<http://www.datasf.org/> and online: NYC Government (New York City)
<http://www.nyc.gov/html/datamine/html/home/home.shtml>.
See online: Government of UK, <http://data.gov.uk>.
See online: EPA < http://www.epa.gov/tri/>; see e.g. Bradley Karkainnen, “Information-forcing
Regulation and Environmental Governance” in Grainne de Burca & Joanna Scott eds, Law and New
Governance in the EU and the US (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) 293. A similar utility is promised for
2011 respecting carbon dioxide emissions. Michael Gerrard, “Greenhouse Gas Disclosure
Requirements Are Proliferating,” (April 1, 2010) 243:61 NYLJ.
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neighbourhood. This is not the place to discuss “Government 2.0,” but one can
readily imagine the transformative impact. The TRI experience is a forceful
illustration of what can happen when “the government exposes capabilities that can
then be used by the private sector” – to generate pressures, or to build (open-source)
programs (like Iphone applications). “If the government invests in key capabilities
that the private sector can then build on, you get this virtuous circle.”
Transparent planning. The text of the APA does not require the public to learn of
potential rulemaking activities before a notice of proposed rulemaking, inviting
comment, is published. The notice the APA requires need not appear until late in
the rule development process. Thus it may be that, as one administrative law scholar
who had also been EPA‟s General Counsel once put it, “[n]otice-and-comment
rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions
– a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something
which in real life takes place in other venues.” The Regulatory Flexibility Act had
already begun to change this state of affairs in the print era, with a requirement that
agencies semi-annually publish a regulatory agenda briefly describing their planned
rulemakings and providing, inter alia, a point of contact within the agency to whom
submissions might be made or with whom discussions could be held. The Unified
Agenda of April 1994 consumed over 1500 pages in the Federal Register, with as many
as six or seven entries per page; there were about 100 pages of index. Initially one of
the most difficult elements of the Federal Register to find and search online, it has now
been integrated into Regulations.gov. It can be searched only one agency at a time,
search capabilities are limited, and – as indicated – the availability of an RIN number
assuring access to all matters in ensuing dockets is, for the moment, uncertain.
American Presidents from Ronald Reagan forward have appeared to wish to build
on this process as a means of increasing central coordination and perhaps control of
rulemaking activities. President Reagan‟s Executive Order 12498 added participation
in an annual “regulatory plan” to the requirements of cost-benefit analysis of
important regulations under the OIRA supervision that he had previously established
by his Executive Order 12291. Yet this planning element of what is now a firmly
established presidential regime, continued as Section 4 of President Clinton‟s E.O.
12866, has remained quite obscure. The literature is full of attention to the problems
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See “US Chief Information Officer Press Conference” supra note 1 at 24:50.
Ibid at 26:00 Development can flow back to government as well. The CeRI initiative discussed
below, a private effort to help the government improve the e-rulemaking experience, is one example.
Another was provided a few years ago by OMBWatch, an NGO monitoring White House activities.
Using federal procurement data the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 required
be made available online, OMBWatch developed <www.fedspending.org> to monitor governmental
spending patterns. Impressed, OMB acquired the program and, adapted to its purposes, it can be
found online: OMB <www.usaspending.gov>. Information from an E-mail from Gary Bass,
OMBWatch (May 6, 2010).
E. Donald Elliott, “Reinventing Rulemaking” (1992) 41 Duke LJ 1490 at 1492-93.
5 U.S.C. §602.
See online: <http://www.regulations.gov/public/component/main?main=UnifiedAgenda=240>.
See text accompanying note 44 above.
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and potential of the cost-benefit analysis of individual rulemakings called for by
Section 6, the effective central element of this regime. But unlike the situation in the
European Union – and for that matter California – where planning is transparent
and such consultations as occur begin early, to date neither priority planning nor the
early public consultations that might go along with it are well developed in our federal
practice. Regulations.gov, for example, offers no chance to submit a request for
rulemaking not already undertaken; while the APA does provide a procedure for
petitioning an agency to engage in rulemaking, this element of its procedures has yet
to be given general electronic form. Individual agencies may well do more in the way
of providing early notice of projects under development, supplementing this resource.
Thus, the EPA has created a rulemaking gateway providing information about the
progress of a “priority regulation” from the moment the beginning of work on the
project has been approved, without regard to whether it is mentioned in the
regulatory plan.
56

57

58

59

IV. CONSULTATIONS
We Americans have long prided ourselves on our notice and comment
procedures for rulemaking.
While other legal systems may often undertake
consultation on proposed regulations, that typically occurs within a limited interest
community identified by the agency, out of public view and rarely required as a
general matter. Of course American agencies may, and indeed sometimes do,
conduct “private” consultations in connection with rulemaking, either before notice
or as they are attempting to digest the results of the public comment period. To the
extent such private consultations, either inside or outside government, produce
consensus around a particular course, they contribute to critical assessments of the
public comment process. Yet the private consultations have a certain odour,
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The Union‟s European Commission publishes periodic workplans of the matters currently under
consideration, and its YourVoice site at <http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index_enhtm>, offers
consultations at quite early stages of proposal development. See text accompanying n 4 above.
See online: OAL <http://www.oal.ca.gov/2009_Rulemaking_Calendar_Office_of_Adminis-trativ.htm>, showing proposed timeline of development.
5 U.S.C. §553(e).
See online: EPA <http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/rulegate.nsf/content/about.html?opendocument>.
Just as APA rulemaking was hitting its stride in the late 1960's, one of the great scholars of the first
APA generation characterized it as “One of the greatest inventions of modern government.”
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.15, (Supp. 1970) at 283.
For a sharp critique of this practice at the Federal Communications Commission, see Philip Weiser,
“Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State” (2009) 61
Admin L Rev 675.
Elliott, supra note 52.
C.f. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), excoriating the practice of private
consultations after a comment period has closed. While the opinion has had limited jural effect, and
seems not to have discouraged the FCC in particular, see Weiser, supra note 61, its practical effect on
most agencies‟ behaviour appears to have been considerable, reaching also into the pre-notice period
to influence the logging of meetings and contacts. See Sidney A. Shapiro, “Two Cheers for HBO:
The Problem of the Nonpublic Record” (2002) 54 Admin L Rev 853; from September 15, 2009, the
White House has made public a database of all visitors, downloadable in machine-searchable form.
Online: White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/disclosures/visitor-records>
(visited April 22, 2010), and EPA posts the schedules of all its senior administrators‟ meetings with
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producing strong impulses to transparency – as reflected, for example, in the quite
detailed procedures associated with statutory procedures for negotiated rulemaking.
And the nature of “hard look” judicial review (considering only such matters as have
come into the public record in support of the adopted rule, and effectively requiring
agency response to important comments) has given the comment process force.
In the paper process world, the comment as well as the notice stage of federal
agency rulemaking provided a limited opportunity. One filed one‟s comments in
paper, only with the requesting agency, and toward the end of the comment period
provided. Consequently, commenters could only expect to address the agency‟s
proposal, not such information or views as others may have provided. Even if one
wanted to read the comments of others, and even if there were time to do so, timely
physical access would have been difficult if not impossible. In contrast to the
consultation practice that, for example, the European Union follows in respect of its
possible legislative initiatives, comments are typically sought relatively late in the
regulation-development process – after, for example, initial consultations with OIRA
over cost-benefit issues.
Enter the Internet, and many elements of the historic notice-and-comment
process might be expected to change. The possibilities of expanded access to
materials forming the basis for proposed rules have already been discussed; if filed
electronically or converted to electronic form, comments (like soft law documents)
can be promptly available nationwide, facilitating response. “Reply” comments
become more feasible, and some agencies are in fact experimenting with their use –
although “wary of extending an already lengthy process and proliferating the number
of comments that must be considered.” Associating the capacity to create a
comment, government-wide, with a utility that permits ready identification of
proposals open for comment and exploration of any data associated with them – this
is the basic design of Regulations.gov – lowers the quantum energy barrier to
commenting, perhaps considerably. The ease and costlessness of filing comments
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persons from outside EPA, with RSS feeds from each. Online: EPA <http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/Calendars?OpenView>.
5 U.S.C. §561 et seq. Although called “negotiated rulemaking,” the process is more aptly described as
negotiated rule development, since if successful its direct result is not a rule, but a notice of
proposed rulemaking generated by a consensual effort among the agency and representatives of
interested groups. It thus constitutes a proceduralization of pre-notice consultation practice;
although encouraged by many (including several Presidents), its costs and limited successes in
practice have resulted in only occasional use of it. See e.g. Stuart Benjamin, “Evaluating ERulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions” (2006) 55 Duke LJ 893 at 922.
Strauss, supra note 4.
See text accompanying note 44 above.
Delays can occur, as agencies must authorize comments to be posted, lest inappropriate or properly
confidential matter appear. ABA Study, supra note 42 at 56 and n 131.
Ibid at 58.
The site permits browsing by an an impressive number of topics (or keywords); in providing for RSS
feeds that might automate notice of developments of interest, however, the site enables subscription
only agency by agency. While some Departments have provided sub-units (the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service, APHIS, and the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, for
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on the Internet could broaden the base of commenters, and empower “political
campaigns” about controversial rulemaking proposals. Even a physical postcard
comment requires a stamp and the effort to write it out, and carries a postmark; an
electronic comment might be filed with a simple click on the website of a soliciting
NGO, and received with no reliable indicator from where and from whom it in fact
came. Within agencies, using computer-based data files (including the possibility of
digital processing of mass communication comments) may make the development of
rules more efficient. The rulemaking agency now reaches its judgment in a much
more transparent setting, if all can readily access the “record” on the basis of which it
acts. Finally, the fact of a consolidated, uniform, and freely accessible “rulemaking
record” also permits enhanced White House participation in/oversight of the agency
decisional process, that in a paper record world would have been largely inaccessible
outside the agency.
As earlier remarked, the implementation of these changes was sharply criticized
in years before the Obama Administration. Regulations.gov is a site in continuing
development, and among the products of the transparency commitments of the
Obama Administration has been an “exchange” site for continuing discussion with
the public of possible changes. Changes already effected make it possible, if one
knows the RIN number of a particular rulemaking, to subscribe for email
notification of any additions to that docket. There remain not inconsiderable
difficulties about programming (what kinds of searches the FDMS will permit) and
agency resources/effort (willingness/ability/time taken to put all material into the
electronic database).
Perhaps the most significant issues, captured in 2006 by a Symposium issue of the
Duke Law Journal, concern the potentially transformative effects of broadscale public
participation, converting what has in general proved to be a low-participation level,
expert process into a more plebiscitary one. Professor Stuart Benjamin, in one
article, finds the unified system of Regulations.gov particularly troublesome;
permitting individual agencies to experiment, he argues, might permit learning
whether the benefits of e-rulemaking outweigh what he sees as its potential costs –
increasing comment quantity without affecting content or result, while making the
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example), others do not – one gets all EPA RSS feeds or none, with no possibility of limitation to the
topic, or even office, of particular interest.
On this issue, see generally the work of Stuart Shulman, a political scientist who with others has
developed a computerized system for handling mass e-mail comments, briefly described in ABA
Study, supra note 42 at 53 & n 126. See e.g. Stuart Shulman (2009) “The Case Against Mass E-mails:
Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. Federal Rulemaking” 1(1) Policy &
Internet, Article 2, online: <http://www.pso-commons.org/policy-and-internet/vol1/iss1/art2>.
See text accompanying nn 41-42 above.
See e.g. text accompanying n 44 above.
See online: Regulations.Gov <http://www.regulations.gov/exchange/node>.
See text accompanying n 44 above.
“Thirty-fifth Annual Administrative Law Issue: The Role of the Internet in Agency Decisionmaking”
(2006) 55 Duke LJ. 893 ff.
Stuart Benjamin, “Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions” (2006) 55
Duke LJ 893.
Here he cites a prominent FCC rulemaking on media ownership rules, in which over a million
comments were received, but treated by the agency as not “terribly helpful or influential.” Ibid at 908
and n 43.
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rulemaking process more costly for resource-strapped agencies; and increasing the
intrusiveness and effects of congressional oversight and judicial review, to similar
effect. There might be a case for modest, skeptical experimentation, but the unified
full-speed-ahead approach signaled by Regulations.gov involve costs that are too
high, benefits that are too uncertain. Professor Cary Coglianese, in another article,
remarks that, historically, the median rulemaking has invited only tens of comments,
few from individual citizens; while this pattern may be changing with the introduction
of electronic comment possibilities, Professor Coglianese (with Professor Benjamin)
is skeptical whether quality gains result. If one discards outlier rulemakings inviting a
particularly high volume of (politically motivated) commentary from the data, some
have reported, he suggests, no dramatic changes in volume – and no changes at all in
substantive contribution – have occurred. “Rather than a revolution in citizen
participation, the end result from even ambitious attempts at e-rulemaking seems
likely to turn out much less interesting than the high hopes many now seem to
harbor.” Professor John Figueiredo‟s study of the results of e-rulemaking at a single
agency, the Federal Communications Commission, similarly found no more than
marginal change.
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V. DIALOGUE?
The Obama Administration appears committed to exploiting the world of social
media to its fullest. One can hardly find a government site lacking blogs, RSS feeds,
twitter pages, facebook links, and the like – and in the service not only of “getting the
message out,” but also receiving input in discussion formats open to participant
“ratings” that, in theory at least, will drive the most popular submissions into clearest
view. President Obama‟s open government initiative, coordinated by the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy, has generated ambitious Open
Government Plans, numerous “open” websites, and similar commitments –
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See also Stuart Shulman, “Whither Deliberation: Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory
Rulemaking” 2006) 3 Journal of E-Government 41; Stephen Zavestoski, Stuart Shulman, & David
Schlosberg, “Democracy and the Environment on the Internet: Electronic Citizen Participation in
Regulatory Rulemaking,” (2006) 31 Science, Technology & Human Values 383; Steven Balla, &
Benjamin Daniels, “Information Technology and Public Commenting on Agency Regulations”
(2007) 1 Regulations & Governance 46.
Cary Coglianese, “Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present and Future” (2006) 55 Duke LJ
943.
“According to one recent study of about 500,000 comments submitted on an especially controversial
EPA rule [addressing airborne mercury levels], less than 1 percent ... had anything original to say.”
Ibid at 959.
Ibid at 968.
John Figueiredo, “E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal Communications
Commission” (2006) 55 Duke LJ 969.
See the EPA‟s 53-page “Open Government Plan 1.0” available online: EPA <http://www.e-pa.gov/open>.
See e.g. the OSTP website <http://www.whitehouse.gov/open,>; in general, one can find an open
website at a top-level government website rather than agency-by-agency – for example online: Open
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proliferating at a dizzying rate, defying delimitation much less assessment in a paper
such as this. Beth Noveck, whose early paper was mentioned earlier, has been central
to these developments.
And for rulemaking? EPA‟s elaborate and very recently published “Open
Government Plan” includes a heading on “Expanding Public Awareness and
Involvement in the Development of Rules and Regulations,” but it does not appear
to be sponsoring dialogue in that context. Perhaps the commitments and style (to
date) of Regulations.gov limits it to an electronic form of the standard “notice and
comment” process. The most interesting development in this respect of which I am
aware is a university project that one might think a descendant – at least a close
relative – of the ABA Report mentioned above. Cynthia Farina, its Reporter, has
also been deeply involved in the Cornell Electronic Rulemaking Initiative [CeRI], an
interdisciplinary effort that with the support of the National Science Foundation and
the Departments of Commerce and Transportation is working generally to facilitate
use of the Internet in rulemaking – and specifically to “[a]ssist[], and actively
promot[e], agency experimentation in Internet-based ways to elicit public
participation beyond just the notice-and-comment process.” One effort, very much
in line with the ABA study, has been to model ways in which the Regulations.gov site
can be made more open, helpful, even educational for the citizen coming to it.
Another, very much in progress as I write, is an experiment in converting a
rulemaking to a discussion format.
The Department of Transportation currently has pending a rulemaking proposal
that would prohibit most “texting” by commercial drivers whose safe conduct it can
directly regulate. CeRI has taken the quite extensive proposed rule and explanation,
and summarized it thematically on its “regulationroom” website. On different days,
different specific elements of the proposal (for example, how is “texting” to be
defined; what drivers are covered; what penalties are provided for) are identified for
discussion, and participants see and react to each other‟s comments on that element.
In effect, the discussion collects comments focused on particular elements of the
rulemaking, where the ordinary comment process is to the whole of a proposal, as
well as facilitating some back-and-forth. At the conclusion of the discussion period,
the CeRI staff developed a draft summary – again open to participant input – and the
final product was submitted to the Department as a public comment on behalf of the
participating discussants.
The last steps – aggregation by an outside body and submission of a unified
comment – would not be required if the Department itself were running the website.
It could itself create the matrix that would permit commenters to focus their
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Government <www.dot.gov/open> but not online: FAA <www.faa.gov/open> where the Federal
Aviation Administration is a subunit of the Department of Transportation
Noveck, supra note 41.
See supra note 83.
See text accompanying n 42 above.
See online: CERI <http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/>
Online: Regulation Room<http://regulationroom.org/>
Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 16391, April 1, 2010 (RIN 2126–
AB22); online: Regulations.gov <http://www.regula-tions.gov/search/Regs/home.html#searchResults?Ne=11+8+8053+8098+8074+8066+8084+1&Ntt=RIN+2126%25e2%2580%2593AB22&
Ntk=All&Ntx=mode+matchall&N=0>.
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contributions on particular issues, in ways that would be transparent to others
interested in the same issues and that would not require responders to search the
whole body of comments (as at present) to see if there were any on the particular
points that might happen to interest them. Agency staff, after the comment period,
would have the significant advantage of a disaggregated collection of comments,
arranged point by point, as well as any general inputs that might have been submitted.
Is it realistic to expect discussion of the interactive nature CeRI hopes to
promote? Will it be too complicated/costly to present proposed rules, often quite
complex and with disparate interrelated sections, in a manner that would facilitate
such focused discussion, if it could be expected? And will open discussion actually
eventuate? Rulemaking is unlike the construction of a Wikipedia, or even early-stage,
free-form consultation on a general question like government openness policy.
People have direct stakes in the outcome, possibly momentous ones – and that can
both magnify numbers past the relatively few interested volunteers who have thus far
appeared in White House on-line consultations, and produce more political
behaviour. One can imagine many other questions about the future of the project –
strongly suggesting, inter alia, that the way forward is by cautious experiment and
observation, not across-the-board imposition of a uniform mode of proceeding.
Perhaps a threshold determination like that now required for negotiated rulemaking is
called for. For the moment, the thing to see is that the presence of the electronic
format permits, if it will not necessarily generate, a kind of dialogue about proposed
rulemaking that simply could not have been imagined in paper format.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is a quarter century since I began telling my Administrative Law students that
they had better be watching the Internet and how agencies of interest to them were
using it, as they entered an Information Age career. The changes since then have
been remarkable. Rulemaking, where the pace has perhaps been slowest, is now
accelerating into the Internet, driven by a President committed to openness and
consultation. This paper seeks little more than to point the reader toward the places
where she can find the changes and watch them for herself.
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Cf. President‟s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, online: PCAST
<http://pcast.ideascale.com/> (one of a number of free-form, on-line collaborative discussions the
Office of Science and Technology Policy has conducted).

